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Event Count Models for International 
Relations: Generalizations and Applications 
International  relations  theorists  tend  to  think  in  terms  of  continuous 
processes. Yet we observe only discrete events, such as wars or alliances, and 
summarize them in terms of the frequency of occurrence. As  such, most 
empirical  analyses  in  international  relations  are based  on  event  count 
variables. Unfortunately, analysts have generally relied  on statistical tech- 
niques that were  designed  for continuous data. This mismatch  between 
theory and method has caused bias, inefficiency, and numerous inconsis- 
tencies in both theoretical arguments and empirical  findings throughout 
the literature. This article develops a much more powerful approach to 
modeling and statistical analysis based explicitly on estimating continuous 
processes from observed event counts. To  demonstrate this class of models, 
I present several new statistical  techniques developed for and applied to 
different areas of international relations. These include the influence of 
international alliances on the outbreak of war, the contagious process of 
multilateral economic sanctions, and reciprocity in superpower conflict. I 
also show how one can extract considerably more information from existing 
data and relate substantive theory to empirical analyses more explicitly with 
this approach. 
Introduction 
Whereas most theories in the social sciences attempt to explain underlying contin- 
uous processes,  we  generally observe only finite numbers of discrete events. Bertram 
M. Gross writes: "[Tlhe world or my part of it is seen as an ongoing stream of events 
in time .  .  . Facts and process are separated into discrete elements only by  human 
analysis  .  .  . Change-whether  rapid  or slow, hidden  or open-is  continuous" 
(Gross, 1968:262). For example, influence  among political actors, the continuing 
allocation of resources, constituency representation, and other aspects of politics can 
all be described as unobserved continuous processes that generate observed discrete 
events. A legislator probably represents constituents in varying degrees continually in 
all aspects of his or her work, but most observers cannot record much more than roll 
call votes and compare them to occasional polls of constituent opinion. The constant 
trade flows between nations are important features of economic cooperation, but an 
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earlier \ersion of this paper. was presented on a panel at the 1988 Midwest Political Science ..\ssociation  meetings; I 
appreciate the suggestions from participants at that panel, particularl) John  hldl-ich and Dan \Vood. Thanhs also 
to the National Science Foundation for research support (KSF #SES-87-22715). 
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analyst might only have a list of major treaties or quarterly summaries of economic 
activities. In the U.S., presidential-congressional relations continuously advance and 
decline, but presidential vetoes and congressional overrides only occur at discrete 
points. 
Since these continuous processes are generally of primary interest but are usually 
unobservable, scholars study the events produced by these processes. Among all the 
fields in political science, international relations is  most closely identified with this 
approach: "Events are at least as important in international behavior as measures 
such as power, development, and status" (Schrodt and Mintz, 1988:217).  The most 
obvious  consequence  of  this  approach  is  the  creation  of  a  number  of  large 
international events data bases. The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), for 
example, records  the number of  international events each day from  1945 to  the 
present  for each  actor-target  pair  of  nations,  issue  area, and level  of  conflict  or 
cooperation.  Other well  known  international  events  data collections  include  the 
World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), the Comparative Research on the Events 
of  Nations  Project (CREON), and the Dimensionality  of  Nations project  (DON).' 
Large data sets such as these are only  the most  conspicuous  international  event 
collections. Throughout the literature of international relations, many smaller data 
sets have been created by individual researchers. For example, scholars have studied 
formal and informal alliances (Russett, 1971; h1cGowan and Rood, 1975),  economic 
sanctions (Hufbauer and Schott, 1983), and international crises. More than forty 
such collections exist in the ICPSR data archive (Vincent, 1983). Even much of the 
data on the US.  presidency in international affairs is in the form of counts of events 
such as executive orders, international treaties, and executive agreements (King and 
Ragsdale, 1988:Chapter 3). International events data have been used to study a wide 
variety of empirical questions and have been used for forecasting and policy making 
(Azar et al., 1977; Rummel, 1979). 
Because  events  and  events  data  play  such  an important  role  in  the  fields  of 
international relations, political scientists should have access to empirical methods 
especially suited to this type of data. Ideally, one ought to be able to theorize about 
the unobservable continuous processes  in international politics and estimate their 
features with existing data on discrete events. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, 
scholars in international relations have neither designed nor exploited such meth- 
ods. The most frequently used statistical model in this area, linear regression, makes 
the incorrect assumption that underlying  continuous processes  generate observa- 
tions that are also continuous. 
In this paper, I argue for a new strategy of modeling and data analysis in this field. 
Toward this end, I present several new but related statistical models developed for 
and applied to different types of existing international relations data sets. I also show 
how  one  can  extract  considerably  more  information  by  this  explicit  modeling 
strategy. Computer programs written to estimate all the statistical models presented 
here are easily accessible.' 
The  first  section  of  this  paper  provides  a  brief  discussion  of  the  existing 
methodology used in the study of international relations. The elements of a more 
sophisticated  methodology  exist  in  this  literature, but  only  extremely  sin~plistic 
' For stud~es  of the qualit) of these clata, see Azar and Ben Dak (1973), Kegley  et al. (1975), and I~rie~~rntio~mi 
Studies Qi~n?-te~lr  (1983). See also h1cClelland and Hogprcl (1969), Azar, Brody. and hIcClelland (1972). Burgess 
and Lawton (1972), and Azar (1982). fbr definitions, coding rules, and theot-etical perspectives. 
I have written an easy-to-use computer program called  COUKT to estimate the models presented here and 
man) other moclels  for event count data. The program works nit11 the Gauss statistical pachage and is available 
either  from me or from the  makers  of  Gauss, Aptech  Systems,  Inc.. 26250  196th Place  South East,  Kent, 
IVashington 98042; 206-631-6679. models have been used. The second section briefly outlines previous methodological 
work from other fields relevant to improving methodology in international relations. 
The  third section builds a "hurdle" event count model of international alliances. The 
fourth section introduces a truncated event count regression model and a variance 
function estimation for data on international economic sanctions. The fifth section 
analyzes conflictual events between  the U.S. and the Soviet Union in  a new joint 
model that enables one to distinguish U.S. +  Soviet conflict, Soviet +  U.S. conflict, 
and tit-for-tat behavior. The final section concludes. 
Empirical Methods in International Relations 
An  exhaustive  classification  and  analysis  of  the  various  methodologies  used  in 
international  relations  research  would  be  a  valuable  contribution,  but  it  is  not 
something  I  intend  to  do here. For  present  purposes,  one can  place  empirical 
methods in this field in three basic categories. 
First, many analyses use essentially descriptive statistics such as graphs, percent- 
ages, annual frequencies, and cross-tabulations. These are the basic tools of statistical 
description, highlighting what  is  to  be  explained  by  theory. As  such, descriptive 
statistics are essential, but they are not relevant  to statistical inference-estimating 
parameters from existing data. Thus, for example, descriptive statistics do not enable 
researchers to properly apply observed  events data to the unobserved  continuous 
processes of international conflict and cooperation. 
Second, among the inferential  methods used  in this  field, statistical techniques 
designed  for continuous, interval level  dependent variables  are by  far the most 
common.  Linear  regression  analysis  and  bivariate  correlations  are  the  primary 
examples, but factor analysis, structural equation models, and most other commonly 
used techniques also belong in this category. 
Consistent  with  the  assumptions  of  regression  analysis  and  other  techniques 
designed  for  continuous  variables,  international  politics  can  be  thought  of  as 
inherently continuous. For example, imagine international cooperation between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union as moving down a real number line representing time. At 
any instant, denoted by  t and corresponding to a point on the line, this process has 
a continuous, interval level value A,,  indicating how warm relations are between the 
two superpowers. If  A, were observed all along the line (i.e.,  for every t),  one would 
have  a  perfect  dependent  variable  with  which  to  analyze  the  ebb  and  flow  of 
superpower cooperation and conflict. 
Although conceptualizing  U.S.-Soviet  relations as a continuous process  is  intu- 
itively  reasonable,  the  values  of  this  process  are  not  observed  at  any  point. 
Fortunately, the process does have observable consequences.  For example, when 
U.S.-Soviet  relations warm significantly (i.e., A, is  large), a discrete event such as a 
summit conference  or treaty  signing might  occur. These discrete  events can  be 
thought of as dots on the real number line, Many other events are also observable, 
such  as  visits  of  lower  officials,  verbal  accusations,  letters  of  protest,  or  troop 
mobilizations.  Each  of  these  events occurs with  higher  or lower  probability  as  A, 
increases  or  decreases.  The  fundamental  assumption  underlying  international 
events data sets is that by observing only these discrete events (the dots on the line), 
an observer still has a sense of  the unobserved continuous variable, "U.S.-Soviet 
relations." 
Whenever analysts in international relations construct operational versions of their 
dependent variables from the lists of observable events, these variables will  not be 
continuous, interval-level measures, as with many measures ir, political economy, for 
example. (They also tend not to be  ordinal or nominal categorical  variables,  as is 
common with survey data in American politics). Instead, most international relations 126  Event Count 12/[odels  fo,  Internutzonal Relatzons 
data are "noncategorical  discrete variables"  (Maddala, 1983:51)-that  is, analysts 
mark arbitrary divisions on the real number line corresponding to months, years, or 
some other convenient decision rule. The number of events in each time period are 
then recorded  and used as  a dependent variable in empirical analyses.' Variables 
measuring the number of times a particular event occurs are called event counts. All 
such  dependent variables  take  on values  of  zero or some  positive  integer. The 
number of conflictual events directed from all nations toward the U.S. in a year, the 
number  of  cooperative events  directed  from  the  U.S. to  the  Soviet Union,  the 
number of inteinational alliances, the number of nations involved in an economic 
sanction, and the number of  coups d'etat in African states are a few examples of 
event counts." 
What happens when  event  count data  are analyzed  by  linear  regression  and 
related techniques? The usual procedure is to conceptualize something like E(Y,) = 
X, > 0 as the expected number of events or the rate of event occurrence at time t. The 
realized  number of events y, (for a finite number of  points, t  = 1,  .  .  . , n)  is  the 
dependent variable. Researchers then typically  regress pi on a set of  explanatory 
variables. This procedure has been shown to yield surprisingly large inefficiencies 
and nonsensical results (see King, 1988). 
To get around the severe heteroskedasticity and other problems associated with 
this procedure, some have taken the natural log of y, and ;egressed  it on the same 
explanatory variables. The log of zero is not defined, however, so ad hoc procedures 
are used. The most common of these is  to add a small constant to y, before taking 
logs, but this seemingly innocuous procedure introduces arbitrarily large biases into 
the analysis. King (1988) showed that by  making small adjustments in the value of 
this constant, one could make the parameter estimates biased by almost any amount 
in any direction. However, no general procedure exists to avoid these biases in the 
context of the logged regression model. 
Some empirical analyses in international relations should probably be disregarded 
entirely, but in many instances they simply fail to extract all potential information 
from the data. In some cases, scholars have probably missed substantial patterns and 
relationships  that  could  have  been  found  in  their  data  with  moEe  powerful 
techniques. This problem is particularly serious in international relations because the 
data tend to be especially noisy, with very large amounts of measurement error. For 
example, Howell (1983) showed that the COPDAB and WEIS data sets disagree on 
the direction of change in levels of U.S.-Soviet  cooperation and conflict in as much 
as  29 percent of years examined. More troubling is  Vincent's  (1983) finding that 
many of  the inconsistencies between  these two  data sets can be  accounted  for by 
syste'matic rather than random variation. In data with such a low signal-to-noise ratio, 
more powerful statistical methods tuned to the special nature of these data can be 
more valuable than decades of new data collection projects. 
The third category of statistical methods used in international relations are Poisson 
process models (see Richardson, 1944; McGowan and Rood, 1975).  These methods 
are more closely applicable to the special nature of event count data, but they have 
been used in only very simple ways. An understanding of this research begins with 
two principles of the process  generating a series of event counts: zndefiendence and 
homogeneity. The principle of independence holds that the probability  of  an event 
'Methods  exist to use  the events nithout this  last stage of aggregation, but data on explanator!  variables in 
political  science tend not to be known at such a detailed level for each time t. See Allison  (1984) and Tuma and 
Hannan (1984) on event histor) analysis. 
'  \Vhen events are weighted in the t~sual  wa)  with non-negati\e integers, s~~ch  as with the COPDAB scheme, the 
weighted e\ent counts are also appropriately analyzed with the class of methods desct-ibed here. occurring at time t + 1, given what has occurred up to time t, is  independent of all 
previous history within  a single observation period. The principle of homogeneity 
holds that  the rate of  event occurrence,  A,,  is  constant  over  period  t. Under the 
independence principle, for example, wars are not contagious-that  is, the occur- 
rence of some wars do  not increase the probability of future wars. Under the homoge- 
neity principle, the rate of war outbreak is constant within entire observation periods 
(but may change between them). It is easy to see how tests of these assumptions are 
critically important to international relations research. 
During an observation period, the rate of event occurrence remains unobserved 
but the count of events at the end of the observation is  observed. From these first 
principles about the process generating a single event count, and a few regularity 
conditions, one can derive a formal probability distribution describing the probabil- 
ity that any number of events will occur. This is  the Poisson distribution (see King, 
1988:Appendix 1, for a derivation): 
where T, is  the length of time in which events were counted during observation t. 
Since all the observation periods are usually the same length (years, months, etc.), 
this variable is set to one and the distribution is rewritten as follows: 
Since at least Richardson (1944), scholars in international relations have often fit 
their data to a Poisson distribution. When the fit to the event count is  good, they 
conclude that the two  first principles about the underlying process are true. The 
virtue of this approach is that it enables users to analyze the observed events data but 
still make generalizations about the underlying process of interest. 
Unfortunately, other sets of  first  principles can  lead  to  the identical aggregate 
Poisson distribution of  events, making some of these backward  deductions to first 
principles indeterminant (see Houweling and Kune, 1984). For example, suppose 
one were analyzing the outbreak of war but the rate of outbreak  A, was  heteroge- 
neous (i.e., varied over the years). If we  merely assume that the realizations of the 
process (the events) do not influence the expected rate (A,),  a Poisson distribution of 
the counts would still fit the data, and one might falsely conclude that A, was constant 
over t. The reason for this is explained by Cramer's theorem: the sum of two indepen- 
dent Poisson  random variables  is  itself  a Poisson random variable. All  backward 
deductions to first principles are not invalid, but we must pay much closer attention to 
probability theory in attempting to make such generalizations. 
Another problem with this third methodology in international relations is  that it 
can  only  address  very  narrow  questions  about  randomness  or deviations  from 
randomness. For example, in part of their analysis McGowan and Rood (1975) use 
one period of one hundred years to study the pattern of alliance formation and its fit 
to a Poisson distribution. Cramer's theorem essentially allows them to partial out and 
then ignore variation in the expected number of events over the years. However, this 
information is arguably among the most interesting parts of the research problem. 
Indeed, such uses  of  the Poisson  process models are analogous  to  performing a 
regression analysis, discarding the parameter estimates, and reporting only a test for 
normality! McGowan and Rood did explore variation in  the expected number of 
events, but existing methodology limited them to the ad hoc procedures of breaking 
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time of their article) would provide them with a way to model explicitly the systematic 
variation in the expected number of events.' 
Although  these  Poisson  process  models  are  on  the  right  track  by  explicitly 
modeling the underlying process and using available observed events for empirical 
estimation, considerably more information exists in events data than one can hope to 
extract with such methods. 
Event Count Regression Models 
One significant improvement in the methods used to study international politics is to 
combine the regression concepts from the second category of methods in interna- 
tional relations with the Poisson process models from the third. The  basic form of the 
solution  to  this  problem  was  analyzed  by  King  (In press-b,  1988).  I  briefly 
summarize the results here. 
The unobserved nonrandom variable of interest is  A, and refers, for example, to 
the degree of international conflict over time. If this were measureable, it would be 
included directly in the analysis. Because, instead, only a count of events from this 
process is observed at the end of each peroid, the basic procedure is to assume that 
the process being analyzed within  each observation period  (year, month, or other) 
may be characterized by  the two first principles, above. Then this count of events 
occurring within observation period t, Y,, may be described by a Poisson distribution 
with mean E(Y,) -  X,  (see Equation 2). 
Finally, we specify the way this continuous underlying process varies as a function 
of measured explanatory variables: 
where x,  is  a vector  of  k  explanatory variables and P  is  a k  x  1 parameter vector 
indicating the influence of each explanatory variable on A,.  x, can include continuous, 
dichotomous, or any other type of meaningful explanatory variables. The exponen- 
tial is  the functional form chosen because  A,  must always be positive, and for other 
theoretical reasons detailed by  King. 
Although the left-hand side of Equation 3 is completely unobservable, the model 
does make is  possible to estimate 0, the effect of  the explanatory variables on the 
dependent  variable,  using  the  method  of  maximum  likelihood  (see  King,  In 
press-a).  The likelihood function may be written as 
with A,  = exp(x,P). 
The basic  idea  of  maximum  likelihood  turns  on  the concept  of  a probability 
distribution. A probability distribution is used to calculate the uncertainty involved in 
the outcome of an experiment (e.g., a coin landing heads for three flips in a row), 
given  some parameter  (p = 0.5 if  the coin  is  fair). Given  a discrete  probability 
distribution like this, one can easily calculate the absolute uncertainty associated with 
any outcome by  plugging in  the values  for the parameters and  the outcome of 
interest into the probability distribution; the resulting measure of absolute uncer- 
tainty is called a "probability," which ranges between zero and one. Inference, on the 
other hand, requires an almost exactly opposite calculation. Here the goal is to assume 
knowledge of the outcome of the experiment (three  flips were tossed, all landed heads) 
" Essentiall)  the same mistake was made b) scholars in three sepal-ate disciplines over fi\e decades in explaining 
the frequent) of  appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court (see Icing, 1987). and to calculate the uncertainty associated with a particular parameter value (p  = 'i). 
The likelihood function [L(ply)],  which is assumed to be proportional to the probabil- 
ity distribution [Pr(j  $)I, enables one to calculate the relative probabilities of different 
values of the parameter (p)  having produced the data we  actually observed. In this 
case, by fixingp at the observed data, one may substitute in hypothetical values of the 
parameters p and watch the value of the likelihood go up or down. The values of the 
parameters for which the likelihood is maximized have the highest relative likelihood 
of having generated the observed data (see King, In press-a). 
Since we  are primarily interested in finding the maximum, any representation of 
the likelihood function that preserves ordinal rankings of L(P1j) with respect to P 
may be used. A representation that is particularly convenient mathematically is the 
log-likelihood. In the case of the Poisson regression model, the log-likelihood is as 
follows: 
Since ln(yt!)  does not vary with test values of P, it can be dropped during estimation. 
Standard numerical  maximization  methods  easily can  be  applied  to  this  globally 
concave  function  by  using one of  many  available computer programs  (see King' 
1988:Appendix 2) that produce maximum likelihood  estimates and corresponding 
standard errors for each parameter estimate. 
King (In press-b)  then relaxes the assumption that events within an observation 
period  must  be  independent  and  homogeneous  by  deriving  a  new  probability 
distribution with  parameters  A, and a2.  If a'  =  1, the distribution reduces to the 
Poisson distribution and the assumption of independence. a' > 1, when the data are 
overdispersed, is evidence of either contagion or heterogeneity; a2  < 1  is evidence of 
negative contagion. 
This new  probability  distribution  is  called  the  generalized  event  count  (GEC) 
distribution and may be written as follows: 
where if a2  < 1 (indicating negative contagion) the probability  of Y,  being greater 
than [- A,/a2 - 11  + 1  is zero, and where D, is a binomial distribution summed from 0 
to [-A,/a2 - 11  + 1. 
This  more  general  distribution  then  may  be  used  to  derive  a  more  general 
estimator, enabling a researcher to estimate rather than assume independence or 
homogeneity of the underlying process. Substituting exp(xJ3) for A,,  the log-likeli- 
hood-reduced  to sufficient statistics-may  be written as follows: 
where 
-exp(x#)  for a' = 1 
-exp(qp) ln(a')(a2 - I)-'  for a2  > 1 
-exp(x,p) ln(a')(a2 - I)-' -  ln(D,)  for 0 < a' < 1 130  Event Count Modelsfor Internatzo?zal Relatzons 
The maximum of this function gives the values of P and cr2 that have the highest 
relative likelihood of having generated the data, given the model. This equation is 
more complicated than that for the Poisson log-likelihood, but it has only one addi- 
tional parameter. The likelihood is being maximized here with respect to P and a2 
rather than just p. 
The following  three  sections  generalize  these  basic  results  to  produce  more 
sophisticated statistical models directly relevant  to the study of different areas of 
international politics. Although the specific models presented below seem likely to be 
useful in other areas of the field, the general approach, more than any individual 
model, is of primary concern. Thus, these three should be considered illustrations of 
how one can model the underlying continuous processes of international relations 
and estimate features of these processes with only aggregate event counts. 
Hurdle Modes of Instability and International Alliances 
Do international alliances affect the rate at which nations enter into war? Deriving 
statistical models for the analysis of this question is  the subject of this section. The 
data for the analysis come from the classic studies of Singer and Small (1966, 1968, 
1969, 1972).  The observed dependent variable is the number of nations who entered 
into a war each year from 1816 through 1965 (excluding data from the world wars, 
1915-19 19 and 1940-1945). The key explanatory variable is the percent of nations 
in the system involved in formal international alliances. 
Since the purpose of this paper is to introduce new methodologies to international 
relations research, in this section and the two that follow I use the simplest possible 
specifications. These help display the essential features of the data and methods but 
do not attempt to address every sophisticated substantive argument in the literature. 
For a sampling of studies on intekmtional  alliances, see singer and Small (1968) 
Wallace  (1973),  McGowan  and  Rood  (1975), Siverson  and  Tennefoss  (1984) 
McDonald and Rosecrance (1985), and Walt (1985). 
To begin the analysis, imagine a continuous unobserved nonrandom variable  A, 
representing the instability of the international system, as indicated by the rate of war 
occurrence at time t. A, is always a positive number, since there is always some small 
chance of a war breaking out. Thus a larger value of A, increases the probability of an 
event, but at no point does it guarantee the occurrence or nonoccurrence of one. 
The theoretical question of interest is whether the international system becomes 
more  or  less  unstable  when  additional  nations  enter  into  formal  international 
alliances. Of course, instability in the international system (A,)  is unobservable at any 
of the infinite number of time ~oints  t in the Drocess, but, the lists of events and the 
count of the number of events during each year is available. 
Thus, let Y,  denote a random variable representing the number of nations that got 
involved in wars in year t. Y, is assumed to have expectation E(Y,) -  A,. By  making the 
two plausible assumptions described above about the underlying process, we  are led 
to the conclusion that Y, is  a Poisson random variable with mean (and variance) A,. 
This Poisson assumption is made all the more plausible by  all the studies showing a 
reasonable fit to this distributi~n.~ 
Further analyses indicate that these data are slightly overdispersed, probably as a result of r\ar being somewhat 
contagious. A reasonable correction, in this particular case only, is merely to double the estimated standard errors. 
The coefficients presented  are consistent, and only marginally  inefficient, in the face of modest overdispersion 
(Gourieroux, hlonfort, and Trognon,  1984a, 1984b). One could  improve the efficiency of these estimates and 
arrive  at  correct  standard  errors  by  moving  to  the  GEL  distribution.  Because  of  the  modest  degree  of 
overdispersion, I avoid this complication in this example. TABLE  1. Poisson regression of nations in ivar. 
Varzuble  Estzmate  Std. Etior  t-Stat 
Constant  0.848  0.059 
Alliances  0.007  0.001  6.454 
Log-likelihood = 49.749 
Observations:  139 
The systematic component of this model is specified as fol1o.i~~: 
A, = exp(Po  + PI Alliances,)  (9) 
To estimate  the  parameters  Po and PI, the  right-hand  side  of  this  equation  is 
substituted into the Poisson distribution in Equation 2, logs are taken and summed 
over all n observations, and the resulting log-likelihood  function in Equation 5 is 
maximized. Estimates of this model appear in Table 1. 
The focus of attention should be on the coefficient of the "Alliances" variable. To 
interpret its effects, note that the derivative of A, with respect to x, is XIPI.  To  make the 
interpretation more concrete, note that the empirical range of  Y is  from zero to 
eighteen nations entering into 'ivar, with a mean of 3.029. The percent of nations 
involved in alliances ranges from zero to eighty. Thus, consider the effect of a fifty 
percentage point increase in the number of nations involved in alliances in the typical 
year (that is, with about three nations entering into wars). This increase in alliances 
leads to about 0.007 x  3.029 x 50 = 1.06 more nations expected to enter into 'ivar. 
Since alliances establish peace among their signatories, it may seem odd that /3,  is 
positive. Alliances are also  mutual defense pacts,  however, sometimes formed to 
allow a nation to go to war. The standard error on this coefficient is quite small, and 
the t-statistic would  surely lead one to conclude that this coefficient is  significantly 
greater than zero. But do alliances really destabilize the international system,  causing 
more nations to go to war? If alliances are made in part to ensure a nation's security 
(Waltz, 1979), this finding is surely questionable. 
Further consideration of these results might lead one to specify a more sophisti- 
cated  model  of  the  underlying  process.  One  possibility  more  consistent  with 
international relations theory is  to imagine that A,  really represents two values,  Ao, 
and A,,.  Lo, is the rate at which the first additional nation gets involved in a war, or, in 
other words, the rate at which  the international  svstem switches from a constant 
number of participants in war to one additional participant. A,,,  then, is the rate at 
which other nations get involved, given that at least one additional nation has become 
involved during the year. These unobserved processes may very well occur simulta- 
neously. The substantive hypothesis is  that the percent of alliances has a small or 
even negative effect on the probability of any additional nations being involved in 
wars. Once the first additional nation commits to an international conflict, however, 
the existence of additional international alliances will drag new nations into the fray. 
Vasquez (1987:  121), for example, concludes that "alliances not only fail to prevent 
wars, but make it likely that wars that do occur will  expand." 
Modeling the onset of war separately from its escalation requires a two-part model. 
Mullahy's (1986) work on hurdle Poisson regression models represents the state of 
the art in this area; the discussion in this section draws, in part, on his work. I first 
define the general form of the hurdle regression model and then derive an estimable 
model as a s~ecial  case. 
Begin by defining a dummy variable d, which takes on the value 0 when J, = 0 and 
1 otherwise  (for t  =  0,. .  . , n). Then a Bernoulli  distribution may  be  used  to 132  Event Coi~nt  LVIodeli  for Inte~natzoncd  Relatzoni 
describe the "hurdle" that the system goes through between no additional nations 
and some additional nations getting involved in international wars: 
where the I,  parameter stands for the probability that Y,  > 0 according to a separate 
stochastic process,fo for the probability that Y, = 0: 
Conditional  on  at  least  one additional  nation  getting  involved  in  a  war,  the 
distribution of Y,  is written as a truncated event count distribution. The method of 
deriving a truncated distribution is based directly on the basic conditional probability 
rule: 
Iff represents some event count distribution defined on the nonnegative integers, f, 
represents  a  corresponding  truncated-at-zero  event  count  distribution  for  the 
positive integers only: 
or, equivalently, 
for j1 E (1, 2, .  .  .} and zero otherwise. 
Note that  fo  and f, define the full stochastic nature of this process. In the standard 
Poisson regression model, for example,  fo  and f, have the same distribution with the 
same mean. In hurdle event count models, however, they map differ completely or 
merely  because  of  different  parameters.  Following  Mullahy  (1986), I  restrict 
attention to the case wherefo andf,  are both Poisson distributions, but where Ao, may 
differ from A_,. 
To construct the likelihood function, observations with J, = 0 must  be  treated 
differently than observations with J, > 0. The two parts appear in separate brackets 
in the likelihood function: 
This  likelihood  function  specifies fo(O(Aol) for  the  observations  with  zeros,  the 
probability of zero nations getting involved in war. For those years where at least one 
nation  took  up arms, the  probability  of  a  particular  number of  nations  getting 
involved  in  war  is  equal  to  1 -  fo(OIAo,)  inultiplied  by  a  truncated  event  count 
distribution with its own parameter. 
A  special  case of  this  model is  the Poisson  hurdle regression  model. Here we 
assume  that  both fo  and f,  are generated  by  nonidentically  distributed  Poisson 
processes  (with  means  hot and  A,,  respectively). To derive  this  model,  lve  first 
calculate the probability of zero events with Equation 2 and simplify: We  then  derive  the  truncated  Poisson  distribution  for  the  positive  integers  by 
calculating the probability that Y, = 0 under a Poisson distribution with a different 
parameter: 
f(O(Ati)  = e-"~  (17) 
and then substituting this result into Equation  14: 
Only  Ao,  and  A,,  separate the process  governing the hurdle crossing from the 
process  governing the number of nations involved  in an existing war. These two 
parameters  each  vary  in  some  unobserved  way  over  the  same  time  period.  In 
general, we  let each vary  separately as  functions of (possibly different) measured 
explanatory variables (xOt  and x,,): 
Aol  = exp(M0)  (19) 
At, = exp(rt,Pt) 
Reduced to sufficient statistics, the full Poisson hurdle regression model log-likeli- 
hood function may then be written as fol1o.i~~: 
which is easily maximized with respect to Po  and P,.  Indeed, since Po  and P,  appear 
in  separate terms  in  the log-likelihood function, these  terms may  be  maximized 
separately. In my experience, however, even simultaneous estimations converge very 
quickly. Note that if Xo = X,  and Po = P,, 
and in this special case the Poisson hurdle specification reduces directly to the basic 
Poisson regression model. In empirical examples, of course, the effect parameters 
are not necessarily equal and the explanatory variables need not be the same. 
Another point of interest about this model is the implied parameterization of the 
probability  that the hurdle is crossed: 
If we  were not deriving a statistical model from basis assumptions made about the 
deeper underlying process,  as  lve  are here, but instead  were  putting  together  a 
data-based model, the first choice would probably be a logit: 
PW,  > OlAo,)  = [1 -  exp(-xotPo)l-'  (23) 
Because its justification is derived from first principles much closer to international 
relations theory, Equation 22 should be more satisfying than the ad hoc specification 
in Equation 23. At the same time, however, researchers are probably more familiar 
with the logistic specification. 
A reasonable question, then, is how the two curves differ. Figure 1 provides an Euent Count Models for  International  Relations 
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FIG.  1. Functional forms. 
intuitive  answer, showing  that the  logistic curve is  symmetric while  the one we 
derived is not. The two curves coincide near the bottom as the lower bound of zero 
"bends" the line up. At the top, the upper bound has an effect much later in our 
curve than in the logit. This asymmetric shape is  quite plausible here since in the 
hurdle model the probability of crossing the hurdle might arbitrarily approach 1.0 
when the expected number of nations initiating conflict (A,,)  is high. The  existence of 
the other process, represented by  A,,,  thus serves to release some of the pressure 
near the top of the curve and creates the small asymmetry. 
Without a large number of observations, empirically distinguishing between the fit 
of  these  two  alternative  specifications  would  be  difficult.  Nevertheless,  having 
derived  this  form  from  deeper  principles  about  the  theoretical  process  being 
analyzed, discovering such subtle sophistications gives one further confidence in the 
first principles and the derived model. 
Consider again the data on the effects of formal international alliances. Table 2 
provides estimates of the Poisson hurdle regression model with a constant and the 
percent  of  nations  involved  in alliances  in  each  equation. The key  result is  the 
difference between the coefficients on the alliance variable in the two parts of the 
model.  The existence of  international  alliances  has  no noticeable  effect  on the 
presence of war (see the small coefficient and the near zero t-statistic). However, once 
TABLE  2. Poisson hurdle regression of nations in war 
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error  t-Stat 
Constanto  0.51 1  0.241 
Alliances  0.001  0.006  0.239 
Constant,  1.010  0.068 
Alliances  0.007  0.001  5.688 
Log-likelihood = 68.43 
Observations:  139 TABLE  3. Poisson hurdle regression of nations in war, an alternative 
specification. 
Vurmble  Estzrnate  Sfd Ellor  f-Stat 
Constant"  0.141  0.290 
Alliances  0.003  0.006  0.430 
Nations,- I  0.143  0.031  4.587 
Constant]  1.010  0.068 
Alliances  0.007  0.001  5.688 
Log-likelihood = 75.859 
Observations:  139 
a  new  war  has  begun  (i.e., once  the  hurdle  has  been  crossed), alliances  have 
essentially the same effect as they  were estimated to have in the standard Poisson 
regression model. 
Aside from these important substantive differences between  the two  models, a 
likelihood ratio test of the improvement provided by  the hurdle model can easily be 
calculated by  taking advantage of the fact that the standard model is nested within it. 
With two degrees of freedom, the chi-square statistic is 2(68.43 -  49.74) = 37.36; so 
one can reject  with  considerable confidence  the hypothesis that no improvement 
occurred with the hurdle model. 
Further  analysis  into  this  substantive  problem  would  require  the  inclusion  of 
appropriate control variables and the testing of a number of specifications to check 
for sensitivity in the empirical results. Although this is  obviously not my  purpose 
here, I do present one additional estimation in Table 3. This estimation includes a 
lag of the dependent variable in the first but not the second part of the model. 
Several  features  of  this  alternative specification  are worthy  of  note. First,  this 
model emphasizes that the parameterizations of hot  and A,,  need not be the same. 
Second, the significant positive coefficient for Nations,-i indicates that when  more 
nations are involved in war one year, the probability increases that the hurdle will be 
crossed again in the following year (i.e., at least one more nation will  be involved). 
The coefficient on alliances does increase somewhat, but it is still only half the size of 
its  standard  error,  so  the  substantive  interpretation  does  not  change.  Third, 
although I do not provide a full complement of event count models that account for 
autocorrelation in this paper, this specification is one example of how to model time 
dependence in hot  and A,,.  For further analysis, one could include lags in the model 
for  A,,  (instead  of y,)  or include  additional lags in  either portion  of  the model. 
Fourth, note that the two coefficients and standard errors in the model for A,,  are 
identical in Tables 2 and 3. This is  a consequence of Po and P- falling in separate 
terms in the likelihood  function. 
Finally, from one perspective, including a lag of the dependent variable makes the 
model  internally  inconsistent.  The first  principles  required  to  derive the Poisson 
distribution for this model included the assumption that events within each year are 
independent. However, using the lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable implies dependence across years. The inconsistency can be resolved in two 
ways. We could relax the assumption of independence within observations by  using 
the generalized  event count distribution. This can and does work  fine, but in this 
empirical case  with  only  modest over-dispersion, I  find that it  has no substantial 
effect on the results. Alternatively, one could insist that war is not contagious in the 
short term but that broad aggregate patterns in the rate of  the onset of war  are 
dependent. Just  how  plausible  this  assertion  is  depends on the features of  one's 136  Event Count Models fo~  Inte~natzona(   relation^ 
empirical question and on the length of the observation periods. In fact, the only 
study that  attempts explicitly  to  model the time series properties in  event  count 
models makes this assumption (see Holden, 1987). 
Truncated and Variance Function Models of Multilateral Economic Sanctions 
What are the conditions under which nations are able and willing to cooperate to 
achieve political objectives (see Oye, 1986)?  I analyze one important example of this 
situation: international cooperation in imposing economic sanctions on a target coun- 
trv. In an interdeuendent world. unilateral economic sanctions are seldom successful. 
Without sufficient cooperation  in imposing a sanction, target countries can often 
switch to alternative markets at little cost. Thus, to achieve political objectives through 
economic sanctions, securing international cooperation is usually essential. 
Data  to  help  analyze  this  and  many  othe;  related  questions  about  economic 
sanctions ha&  been  collected  by  Martin  (In progress) ind Hufbauer  and Schott 
(1983). The data  to  be  used  here  involve  seventy-eight  incidents  of  economic 
sanctions since the economic blockade of Germany in World War I. An economic 
sanction is defined as "the deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of 
withdrawal,  of  'customary'  trade  or  financial  relations"  (Hufbauer and  Schott, 
1983:2). 
The continuous unobserved  nonrandom variable  in this problem is  the level of 
international cooperation in economic sanctioning behavior, A,. In principle, A, exists 
at all points in time, since economic incentives of all kinds are ubiquitous tools in 
foreign policy. If A, were observable and measurable, one could use it as an optimal 
dependent variable; but optimal variables rarely exist in political science. In its place 
as the dependent variable, however, 1t.e have the number of nations participating in 
each of seventy-five instances of economic  sanction^.^ Thus the observed dependent 
variable is again an event count. However, this particular event count has at least two 
interesting  features  worthy  of  future  study.  I  now  analyze  this  model  in  the 
traditional way, and then complicate the model in two ways to exploit these features 
of the data. 
Consider, first, a simple model of the systematic component for A,,  the expected 
number of nations cooperating: 
where the variable Stability, is  a measure of the target country's overall economic 
health  and  political  stability  during the  sanctions episode, abstracting  from the 
effects of the sanctions. Stability, is coded on a scale from 1 (distressed)  to 3 (strong 
and stable). The hypothesis is  that more nations will join  the sanction if  the target 
country is weak and, therefore, the effort is likely to be successful. Cost, is a measure 
of the effect of the sanction on the sanctioning (or "sender") country. Hufbauer and 
Schott's  (1983:84) analysis implies that a more costly sanction will  encourage the 
sender country to obtain cooperation from other nations. Another possibility is that a 
sanctioning country willing to bear high cost is  also a country with strong resolve; 
other nations might be more likely to participate in this situation. Cost is coded from 
1 (net gain to sender) to 4 (major loss to sender). 
Appealing to the two principles required to derive the Poisson distribution in this 
case seems quite unreasonable. Indeed, a key feature of this substantive problem is 
'  I deleted three outliers. Whereas the mean number of senders is  3.4 in the sample of sexenty-five, the three 
omitted sanctions included primarily U.K.  sponsored activities where a large proportion of the nations of the ~orld 
joined the effort. TABLE  4. Negative binomial regression of nations sanctioning. 
Vnrzable  Estzmute  Std  Error  t-Stat 
Do  0.707  0.409  1.726 
Stability  -0.217  0.145  -  1.496 
Cost  0.510  0.108  4.71  1 
?  0.607  0.334  1.814 
Log-likelihood = 124.769 
Observations:  73 
Mean Number of  Nations Participating = 3.4 
the contagion among nations. In many cases, the sending nation intentionally tries to 
get others to join the effort against the target. Hence, the assumption of indepen- 
dence is not only implausible, but it would  seem to strip the problem of one of its 
most interesting features. 
Before complicating the model, then, I move from the basic Poisson process to the 
generalized  event  count  (GEC) distribution  (Equation 6). Since  over-dispersion 
(resulting in this case from contagion) is almost certain to be  present, u2  will  be 
greater than one. To  simplify later analysis, I use the negative binomial distribution, 
a special case of the GEC when u2  > 1. Also for later simplification, I reparameterize 
this distribution so that c2  = 1 + 8 and 8 = exp(y). Thus, the expected value is still 
E(Y,)  =  A,  (25) 
but the variance is now 
The full distribution is  then written for a single observation as follows: 
where 6'  = exp(y). Note that this reparameterization has no substantive effect on the 
present analysis, but it will make calculations easier in the models developed below.8 
Larger values  of  y  mean  that  more overdispersion  (and therefore contagion) is 
present in these data. 
By  substituting the right-hand side of Equation 24 into the probability distribution 
in Equation 27, taking logs, and summing over observations, the log-likelihood may 
be derived. Maximizing this function gives the maximum likelihood estimates of Po, 
PI,  P2, and y. Empirical results appear in Table 4. 
First note the level of dispersion, P. If nations chose to institute economic sanctions 
unilaterally, the variance of  Y,  would  equal its mean, A,.  In this case, however, the 
variance is [I f exp(0.607)] = 2.83 times greater than its mean, indicating moderate 
contagion in sanctioning decisions (but see the next model, below). 
Both of the explanatory variables appear to have modest effects. The stability of a 
target country decreases international participation by about -0.2 17A, more nations. 
Thus, for the typical sanction with about 3.4 nations participating, an increase on the 
stability  scale  from  a  distressed  nation  to  a  strong and  stable  nation  decreases 
participation by  about -0.217  x 2 X  3.4 = -1.48  more nations, although this effect 
The other advantage of  this parameterization is that all parameters now vary between negative and positive 
infinity. This is  an  advantage because  the theory  and practice  of  numerical  optimization  have  not yet  dealt 
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is  not quite  significant by  conventional standards. For  each  unit  increase  in  the 
four-point cost-to-sender scale, an additional 3 x  0.510 =  1.33 more nations  are 
convinced to join  in the sanction. 
In virtually  all  substantive  problems in  international  relations,  one has  only  a 
sample  of  realized  values  from the  process  governed  by  A,.  In many  problems, 
however, the sample is  either roughly random or periodic, as in monthly or yearly 
observations. For the number of nations entering into wars, analyzed in Section 4, 
the sample was based on annual data; but, in the present example realizations of the 
process are only observed when a major sanction takes place. Thus, these data likely 
have  two  types  of  selection  bias. The first  is  that  if  zero  nations  cooperate in  an 
economic sanction, the observation  never appears in the data set. As  a result, the 
observed  data J, are always greater than zero. Second, the cases included in the 
analysis are "somewhat biased toward the big case" (Hufbauer and Schott, 1983:2). 
Thus, some cases of economic sanctions with relatively few nations participating did 
not come to the attention of the coders. 
I now construct a model that takes into account the truncation-at-zero problem. 
This model will  not directly address the second type of  selection bias, where the 
truncation threshold is  greater than zero and probably stochastic, but this problem 
seems less  severe in this  substantive  example (see Achen  [1986] for insight  into 
selection bias problems in the context of linear models, Maddala [1983] for a review 
of limited dependent variable problems in general, and Cohen [1960] and especially 
Grogger and Carson [1988] for studies of truncated count data models). 
The key  problem  with  sample  selection  appears  when  the  rule  for  selecting 
observations into the analysis is correlated with the dependent variable. Selection on 
an explanatory  variable  causes  no  particular  problems. The present  example is 
extreme since an international economic sanction is  observed and included in the 
data  set  only  if  J, > 0, so  the  selection  rule  is  deterministically  related  to  the 
dependent variable. What effect do sample truncation problems have on empirical 
results? An intuitive way to think of the problem is that sample truncation causes the 
regression line to be artificially bounded (in this case from below). The more dramatic 
the truncation the flatter the regression line is estimated to be. Thus, tru?zcation causes 
effectparameters to be biased toward zero. The  estimates in Table 4 are probably too small. 
Estimating these  parameters from a model that explicitly takes  into account the 
truncation should yield larger estimates. 
A truncated-at-zero data distribution can be  derived  from the parent negative 
binomial distribution just as it was for the Poisson in Section 4. Equation 14 provides 
the  necessary  formula.  The  probability  of  a  zero  under  a  negative  binomial 
distribution is derived by  substituting J, = 0 into Equation 27: 
f,,b(OIA,,  6) = (1 + o)-~"*  (28) 
Thus, the full truncated-at-zero negative binomial probability  distribution may be 
written as follows: 
The bracketed term in the denominator is the only difference between the negative 
binomial and this  truncated  negative binomial distribution. If  negative contagion 
seems a reasonable possibility, one could generalize this to a truncated-at-zero GEC 
distribution.  But  since  countries  such  as  South  Africa  that  are likely  to  create 
negative contagion are not in the habit of  imposing economic sanctions on other 
nations, this generalization seems unnecessary in the present example. TABLE  5.  Truncated  negative  binomial  regression  of  nations 
sanctioning. 
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error  t-Stat 
Constanto  -0.785  1.623  -0.483 
Stability  -0.869  0.453  -1.918 
Cost  1.265  0.619  2.045 
f  1.531  0.428  3.578 
Log-likelihood = 133.57  1 
Observations: 73 
The log-likelihood is then derived directly from this distribution: 
with A, defined in Equation 24 and 8 = exp(y).  The maximum likelihood estimates 
based on this model appear in Table 5. 
Note that the log likelihood has increased significantly, indicating that this model is 
more likely to be the true one than the untruncated model estimated in Table 4. The 
key substantive result here is that by explicitly taking into account the truncation, the 
effect parameters are now estimated to be more than three times as large. Thus, if 
about  3.4 nations  could  be  expected  to  participate in  an economic sanction  on 
average, a two-point increase on the stability scale (from 1 to 3) would decrease the 
number of nations participating in the sanction by  about -0.869  x  2 x  3 = -5.21 
more nations (compared to an estimated effect of -  1.48 nations from the untrun- 
cated  negative binomial  model). The t-statistic  has  also increased. For each  unit 
increase in the four point cost-to-sender variable, an additional 3.4 x  1.265 = 4.3 
more nations are convinced to join  in the sanction (compared to only  1.53 under 
the negative binomial). In addition, the truncated model allows a better estimate 
of  contagion  among nations  in  sanction  participation:  the variance  is  now  1 + 
exp(1.531) = 5.62 times greater than the mean, reflecting a considerable  amount 
of  contagion.  The  fundamental  lesson  here  is  that  explicit  modeling  of  the 
underlying continous process and its relationship to the observed data dramatically 
improves empirical results. 
I now complicate this truncated model further with a more explicit examination of 
the contagious  process by  which  nations  convince  other nations  to  participate in 
economic sanctions. For all the models presented until now, I have assumed that the 
variance of Y, was proportional to its mean. Thus, in the present parameterization, 
V(Y,) = A,(l + 8)  (3  1) 
Both the mean and the variance are assumed to vary over the different observations, 
but the two are closely tied together. In the present substantive example, however, 8 
is  not  a  nuisance  parameter. It indicates  the  degree  to  which  participation  in 
economic  sanctions  is  contagious, a  fundamental  part  of  the research  problem. 
Whereas theory usually causes us to focus on how the mean A, varies as a function of 
a set of explanatory variables, the present substantive example causes us to focus on 8 
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The general problem is called variance functzon  estimation and, although some work 
has been done in the area (see Davidian and Carroll, 1987), it has heretofore not 
been extended to event count models. I derive this new model by  first adding the 
subscript t to  I9  so that it can vary over the observations. 0, is then conceptualized as 
the degree of contagion among nations at time t. Like A,,  19, is not observed at any point 
in time, but something like it certainly does exist in theory. We can use the same events 
data to estimate the influence of specified explanatory variables on 8,. 
Since  6,  has  some  of  the  same  formal characteristics  as  A,,  we  use  the  same 
functional form. Hence, 
where Z, is a vector of kl explanatory variables and y is now a kl x  1 parameter vector. 
The variables selected to comprise z, can be the same as or different than the ones in 
the mean function, x,. 
The log-likelihood function is derived for this model by substituting Equations 32 
and 24 into the truncated negative binomial probability distribution and taking logs. 
One could create a simpler version of this model by  substituting into the untrun- 
cated negative binomial distribution, but the truncated distribution is  most appro- 
priate for the present case. Thus, 
[exp(x,P) + pl] In  [ 1 + exp(x,P)I  + >(xtP) -  expo 
For present exploratory  purposes,  I  let z, contain just  one variable. US, which  is 
coded  as  1 if  the U.S. is  the major  sender and 0  otherwise. Empirical estimates 
appear in Table 6. 
Note first that the log-likelihood for this model is considerably higher than that for 
the standard negative binomial model and the truncated negative binomial generali- 
zation. The advantages of this truncated variance-function negative binomial model 
over  the  standard models  are apparent. First,  this  more realistic  model  of  how 
contagion varies  allows better  estimates of  the  parameters; both turn out to be 
larger and more precisely  estimated  here than in the previous  negative binomial 
model. Second, this  model enables one to extract considerably more information 
from the same data. For example, the negative coefficient on the US variable says 
TABLE  6. Truncated  negative  binomial  regression with  variance 
function of nations sanctioning. 
PO  -0.868  1.232  -0.705 
Stability  -0.938  0.451  -2.070 
Cost  1.417  0.5  17  2.740 
Log-likelihood  = 172.608 
Observations: 75 TABLE  7. Independent poisson regressions of U.S.-Soviet  Conflict. 
C.S. +  Sou.  Sou. --, r.s. 
Varzable  Est.  Strl. Ew.  t-Stat  Est.  Std. Ew.  t-Stat 
Constant  3.888  0.030  3.843  0.095 
Military$  -0.003  0.001  -5.050  -0.002  0.002  -  1.042 
President  0.120  0.018  6.576  0.468  0.017  28.323 
US. -, Sob. Log-likelihood = -223.72 
Sob. +  U.S. Log-likelihood = -241.80 
Mean number of events US. +  Sov. = 44.53 
Mean number of events Sov. +  US. = 52.64 
Observations: 28 
nothing about how many more or fewer nations will participate when the U.S. is the 
leading sender, but it does indicate that international participation in sanctioning 
targets chosen by the U.S. is less contagious than when other nations are the leading 
senders.  This  effect  reflects  the  fact  that  the  U.S.  tends  to  make  economic 
sanctioning decisions without receiving prior support from its allies. In these cases, 
then, decisions to participate by  other nations tend to be more isolated. 
Unobserved Poisson Variable Models of Reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet  Relations 
Does military spending by one superpower deter or provoke the other superpower? 
The  observed dependent variable is from the COPDAB event data archive. For 193  1 
to 1978, the number of conflictual actions the U.S. directed at the Soviet Union and 
the number the Soviets directed at the U.S. are recorded as annual event counts. 
I again begin by focusing on the underlying continuous processes of interest. Let 
01,  be a nonrandom variable representing the degree of conflict originating with the 
U.S. and directed at the Soviet Union. Similiarly, let  Opt be the degree of conflict 
originating with  the  Soviet  Union  and directed at  the U.S." To explain conflict 
originated  by  the  U.S., I  include  a  measure of  Soviet  military  expenditures  (in 
constant 1970 billions of U.S. dollars) and a dummy variable for the party of the U.S. 
president (coded 1 for Democratic presidents and 0 for Republicans). U.S. military 
expenditures (also measured in constant 1970 billions of U.S. dollars) and the same 
president  variable are included to explain conflict originated by  the Soviet Union 
(military expenditure data are from Ward, 1984:3  1  1). 
I begin the empirical estimation with two independent Poisson regression models, 
allowing 01,  and 021  to be exponential linear functions of military spending of the 
other superpower and the dummy variable  for the  party  of  the  U.S. president. 
Empirical results appear in Table 7. 
The variable  hlilitary$,  refers to  Soviet  domestic military  spending in the first 
equation  and  U.S. spending in  the  second.  In  both  models,  this  coefficient  is 
moderately  negative,  indicating  that  military  spending by  a  superpower  deters 
conflict directed at it by  the other superpower. In the first equation, explaining the 
conflict directed from the U.S. toward the Soviets, a ten billion dollar increase in the 
Soviet defense budget yields about -0.003  x  10 x  44.53 = -  1.3  fewer hostile acts 
directed at the  Soviets  per year. The coefficient is  smaller  in  the Soviet + US. 
equation, with  a larger standard error. Nevertheless,  by  running only  these  two 
" 61, and 62, co~dd  be called XI,  and Apt to be consistent with prebious usage. 1 introduce this alternatibe notation 
here in order to be consistent in the more sophisticated model to be developed below. 142  Euent Count Modelc for  Inte7nat~onal  Relatzonc 
regressions, an analyst might reasonably conclude that deterrence works: the level of 
conflictual actions directed at a nation appears to drop if  that nation increases its 
defense budget.'' 
Although these  results  seem intuitive from one perspective,  a further analysis 
yields considerably different insights. The most critical problem in the current setup 
is  defining more precisely what 01, and 02, should mean. As  it is, the) represent the 
overall level of hostility  directed from one superpower to the other. However, in 
theory at least, one can separate out at least two types of conflictual dyadic behavior 
in each of these nonrandom variables. For example, some of the aggregate level of 
U.S. +  Soviet conflict is surely domestically generated. No matter how good relations 
are, the U.S. will  probably always object to what it views  as  Soviet human rights 
abuses.  Similarly,  the  Soviets  are unlikely  to  stop complaining  about  effects  of 
U.S.-style imperialism. On the other hand, some of the conflictual behavior between 
these  two  nations  is  merely  a  response  to  each  others'  conflictual  actions.  For 
example, the U.S.  claims  to  have -caught a  Soviet  spy  and expels  a  half-dozen 
members of the Soviet embassy. In response, the Soviets expel a dozen members of 
the US.  embassy in Moscow. This tit-for-tat conflictual behavior or specific reciproc- 
ity  may  continue  for several  more iterations until  one side eventually  stops. In 
theory, pure conflict  directed toward another superpower and tit-for-tat behavior 
are fundamentally different types of superpower relations. For different substantive 
purposes either or both might be of interest. For example, in a study of the domestic 
sources of international conflict, tit-for-tat behavior should probably be excluded or 
analyzed se~arately 
In international relations theory,  reciprocity  is  of considerable interest.  Under 
certain  conditions,  it  can  lead  to  cooperation or even  a  semipermanent  "feud" 
between nations (see Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Koehane, 1986). 
Whereas Ail and A2, are the degrees of conflict originated solely by the U.S. or solely 
by  the Soviet Union, respectively, I define a separate variable, AS,, for the degree of 
tit-for-tat conflictual behavior. This specification assumes that superpower responses 
to each other occur at roughly the sake  level and intensity; if the;  dih not, onemight 
think about including a separate tit-for-tat variable for each country. 
Thus, let 01, = hi, + AS, be the total degree of conflict directed from the U.S. to the 
Soviet  Union,  with  hl, as  the  domestically  originated  portion  of  this  conflict. 
Similarly, let  02, = A2,  + A3,  be total conflict directed from the Soviet Union at the 
U.S., with  As,  as the domestically originated portion. These three variables are each 
unobserved, nonrandom, and theoretically distinct. The goal is to derive explanatory 
models for hi,,  A2,, and A3,. Just as with the models in the previous sections, we could 
easily specify: 
where x,,  w,,  and z, are vectors of explanatory variables and P, y, and 6 are effect 
parameter vectors. However, not only are All, A*,, and AS, unobserved, as they were in 
the previous models, but we have no obvious empirical measure of any of the three. 
The COPDAB data set records total conflictual events with an actor and target, but 
none of the variables distinguish domestically  originated from tit-for-tat behavior. 
With the model I derive below, existing data can be used to estimate P,  y,  and 6. This 
case is  an interesting example of  my  approach: deriving coding rules for distin- 
'O  Note  that  the  two  log-likelihoods cannot be  compared with  each other because  the\  are calculated  from 
d~fferent  data sets  The\ are ~ncluded  here for later reference. guishing between the types of international conflict seems difficult, if not inlpossible. 
Thus, existing data combined with this new model are almost sure to reveal more 
useful information than would an expensive new data collection effort. 
I  begin  by  assuming  that  Y?,,  Y;,,  and  Y;,  are  unobserved  random  Poisson 
variables representing international conflict of the U.S. directed toward the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet Union toward the U.S.,  and tit-for-tat actions directed toward each 
other, respectively. Thus, 
YTt -  fP(yTtIhit)  (37) 
YSi -  fP(y $1  Apt) 
Y%t -  fp(j  %t h3t) 
where E(Yyt) = A,,  for j  = 1, 2, 3, and, conditioning on these expected values, the 
three variables are assumed independent. Thus, the expected length of the tit-for- 
tat behavior, once initiated, may depend on the true levels of  U.S. +  Soviet and 
Soviet + U.S. conflict, but the random variation  of these three variables  around 
their own expected values are stochastically independent. If the realizations of these 
random variables, j*], (for  j  = 1, 2, 3), were each observed, this analysis could pro- 
ceed just  as  with  the  standard Poisson  regression  model in Section 2. Although 
they are not observed, we do observe realizations of random variables that are two 
functions of these three variables: 
Y1, = YT, + Y;t  (38) 
Ypl = Y$, + Y%, 
and, because of  Cramer's theorem-the  sums of independent Poisson distributed 
random variables are also Poisson distributed-we  can write: 
But, this is  still insufficient to derive an estimable model, since the two terms in the 
expected value in each distribution cause them each to be separately unidentified. 
Fortunately, thanks to Holgate (1964:241; see also Johnson and Kotz, 1969:297- 
98; and King,  In press-c), we  can generalize a result to solve this  problem. The 
solution is based on a proof that, given conditions equivalent to those stated above, 
Yl, and YZt are distributed as bivariate Poisson variables: 
Because of the special properties of this distribution, if no tit-for-tat behavior exists 
and therefore h3, turns out to be zero for all t, then the bivariate Poisson factors into 
the  product of  two  independent Poisson  variates.  As  such, this  distribution  is  a 
straightforward generalization of the univariate Poisson, and since the covariance of 
Y1, and YSl is  A31r this setup is  a generalization of the Seemingly Unrelated Poisson 
REgression Model Estimator (SUPREhlE)  developed by King (In press-c).  Since the 
unobserved variables Y ?,, Y %,,  and Y Tt remain the primary focus of the analysis, this 
variant  of  the  SUPREhIE  model can  also  be  conceptualized as  a discrete factor 
model. Thus, a test for Ajl equaling zero is equivalent to a test for whether this model 
is  extracting  more  information  from  the  data  than  two  independent  Poisson 
regression  models applied  to jl,  and y2,  separately. To the extent that tit-for-tat 
behavior  exists  and  Ajt  is  different  from zero, separate Poisson  models  produce estimates of  p  and y  that are not only  statistically inefficient but are biased  and 
inconsistent  as  well.  And  in  addition  to  improving  the  properties  of  existing 
estimators, this model also enables one to estimate the explanatory variables' effect 
on and the raw extent of tit-for-tat behavior-answering  key substantive questions 
one could not hope even to address with standard methods. 
To estimate p,  y, and 6, I substitute the right hand sides of Equations 34, 35, and 
36 into Equation 40, take logs, and sums over the n observations. The result is the log 
likelihood  f~~nction: 
This well-behaved function is then easily optimized to yield the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the effect parameters, p, y, and 6. No identifying restrictions need be 
put on the three sets of explanatory variables. They may be identical or may differ, 
depending on theory. 
Consider now a  joint estimation with the new model developed above. This model 
now  permits  the  degree  of  tit-for-tat behavior  between  the  superpowers  to  be 
estimated rather than assumed. To estimate this model, I leave the specifications for 
hi,  and h2,  as functions of military spending of the other superpower and the party of 
the US,  president. These two nonrandom variables are interpreted as international 
conflict, stripped of any tit-for-tat behavior. In addition, I specify a model for h3,,  as 
in Equation 36. Although one could develop a long list of explanatory variables, I 
keep the specification simple by  assuming that tit-for-tat behavior is an exponential 
function only of the average superpower military spending (AvghIilitary$,) and the 
party of the U.S. president. The empirical results appear in Table 8. 
The overall improvement in moving from the two Poisson regression models to 
this joint estimatibn can be judged bykxamining the log-likelihoods. Since the two 
models  in  Table  7  were  estimated  independently,  the  log-likelihoods  may  be 
summed to  arrive  at a total  log-likelihood,  -223.72  = 241.80  =  -465.52.  This 
number can be compared to the likelihood from Table 8 to derive a test statistic. The 
likelihood ratio test statistic in this case is  2(-397.04  + 465.52) = 136.96. This is  a 
chi-square statistic with 2 degrees of freedom. Thus, the hypothesis of no difference 
between the models is comfortably rejected. 
TABLE  8. SUPREME2 model of US-Soviet  conflict 










Log-likelihood = -397.04 
Observations:  28 The most surprising result is  the parameter estimates for military  spending. It 
appears that deterrence does not work as it seemed to work from the results of the 
independent Poisson regression models. Instead, U.S. military spending seems very 
clearly to provoke hostile Soviet action toward the U.S. Indeed,  Soviet military spend- 
ing also provokes U.S. conflictual actions at almost exactly the same rate. Whereas the 
independent Poisson  models  explained  total  US. and Soviet actions, this  model 
extracts tit-for-tat behavior as a separate variable. Indeed, this more sophisticated 
model  shows that higher levels of  average superpower military  spending reduce 
tit-for-tat behavior, presumably because such superfluous conflictual behavior  be- 
comes more dangerous with bigger military budgets. Military spending appears to 
provoke serious hostile actions but to deter superfluous ones. 
Since the typical value of average military spending is 61.44 billion US,  dollars, the 
typical value of hJi  may be calculated as: 
Thus, of all the conflictual acts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, an average of 
6.9 of these events a year are merely tit-for-tat behavior. This represents  15.5%  of 
the typical year of U.S. +  Soviet acts and 13.1%  of Soviet +  U.S. acts. Only with this 
new model can these three types of behavior be extracted from the two existing data 
series. 
Goldstein and Freeman (1988) show that virtually all previous studies based on 
annual data are unable to find evidence of reciprocity, and nearly all based on less 
aggregated data find substantial evidence. This analysis, which uses annual data but 
nevertheless finds clear evidence of reciprocity, dramatically demonstrates how the 
considerably more powerful models introduced here can extract far more informa- 
tion than the con~monly  used techniques. 
The independent Poisson  models  were  biased  primarily  by  the contamination 
from tit-for-tat behavior. Once this behavior is separated out analytically, empirical 
results become much clearer and substantive findings significantly different. 
Conclusions 
I  have  introduced  several  related  statistical  models  designed  explicitly  for  the 
theoretical  perspectives  and  existing  data in  the field  of  international  relations. 
Scholars in this field often think in terms of the continuous but unobserved processes 
of  international  conflict  and  cooperation,  while  their  data  consist  primarily  of 
noncategorical discrete event count variables. The methods introduced here permit 
researchers in international relations to connect theory with empirical analyses more 
explicitly  by  estimating  features  of  these  continuous  processes  of  international 
politics with existing collections of event count data. 
The models developed were illustrated with three applications from international 
relations data-the  influence of international alliances on the outbreak of war, the 
contagious  process  of  economic sanctions, and an analysis of  dyadic  superpower 
conflict. If only the specific models I present here are applied to future research, this 
paper will have made its contribution. But I also hope that scholars will begin to think 
about political methodology somewhat more creatively. Too often we  choose our 
methods because they  exist in our local computer package. Imagine how silly the 
field ~vould  look if  we chose theoretical arguments in a similar manner. The class of 
statistical techniques developed here offers solutions to several specific problems in 
empirical  research  in  international relations.  But is  also offers a new  and  more 146  Euent Count Models for  Inte7nut~onul  Relatrom 
flexible approach to quantitative methodology. Both the specific techniques and the 
more general methodology should be exploited. 
The field of international relations is more than a list of facts and theories about 
international cooperation and conflict; it is a way of understanding world affairs. At 
its  most  ambitious, the field  attempts to  develop methods by  which  nations with 
conflicting interests can survive in an interdependent world. International relations 
is as fundamentally a methodological discipline as it is a theoretical or empirical one. As 
the  field  progresses,  we  need  to  pay  more  attention  to  these  ~nethodological 
foundations and to develop new statistical models that enable us to estimate more 
directly new features of theoretically interesting processes and to find new ways of 
extracting information from the enormous body of existing data. 
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